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INTRODUCTION

Computer technology plays an increasingly important role in our
lives. The computer industry has been growing at a phenomenal rate,1
2
paced in recent years by explosive growth in the software segment.
The increasing importance of software has stimulated considerable competition, both legitimate and illegitimate. While the creation of original
software products is a highly labor-intensive process, literal copying is
exceptionally easy. The unscrupulous copier faces only minuscule bar*

Author Mark M. Friedman attends University of Houston Law Center. This Arti-

cle was awarded first place in the 1988 Center for Computer Law National Writing
Competition.
1. Note, Computer Copyright Law: An EmergingForm of Protectionfor Object Code
Software After Apple v. Franklin, 5 COMPUTER L.J. 233 (1984).
2. In 1983, revenue from software sales increased at a rate 2.5 times the increase in
hardware sales. Standard and Poor, Computer Hardware Industry, STANDARD AND
POOR'S IND. SURVEYS (1984).
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riers. 3 As a result, software piracy has reached epidemic proportions,
robbing the industry of billions of dollars in potential revenues. 4 While
software pirates limit themselves by producing a relatively limited
number of copies for distribution to friends or to a small number of paying clients, in the aggregate, such piracy adversely impacts the software
industry.
Cloning, a related yet distinct phenomenon, has emerged lately. To
create a clone, a would-be competitor reproduces a successful software
program with the aim of openly marketing the new program to the public. The reproduction is carried out after studying the functioning of
the original and without literally copying it. A clone is not the product
of literal copying. The competitor does not in any way use the original
computer code. He simply purchases a software package at retail and
studies those aspects of the program which are apparent to any legitimate user. The competitor then creates a new computer code which
emulates the functioning of the original program, usually with some
changes and enhancements. While recreating software in this manner
requires great skill and a significant investment of time, it is considerably easier than developing original software.
Computer software currently enjoys several layers of legal and extralegal protection. The need to preserve incentives for developers of
original software in the face of the relative ease of both literal and nonliteral copying may motivate this protection. Copyright law is one form
of protection. The 1980 amendments to the 1976 Copyright Act, 5 and arguably the 1976 Act 6 itself, afford copyright protection to software.
Thus, courts have applied copyright law to computer software for the
last decade, but with highly inconsistent results. This yielded a series of
conflicting standards of copyright infringement. It also led to dislocations which threaten to skew the social bargain between software developers and society at large. This social bargain is the very underpinning
of copyright law. Consequently, its distortion threatens to undermine
copyright law as applied to non-software works.
This Article suggests that courts must struggle to apply copyright
law to software, because copyright law is inherently inappropriate for
software protection. The Copyright Act should be amended to exclude
computer software in machine language form from its scope. Such exclusion will not leave software unprotected, since other means of protection, primarily trade secrecy law, are available. The alternatives to
3. Software programs worth hundreds or even thousands of dollars can easily be
copied onto blank diskettes which can be purchased for a few dollars.
4. Note, The Scope of Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs: Eploring the
Idea/frpressionDichotomy, 43 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373 (1986).

5. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1982).
6. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1982).
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copyright protection more adequately balance the interests of rewarding
software developers for their efforts while ensuring vigorous
competition.
Part II of this Article provides a brief history of the computer
software industry and a thumbnail sketch of software technology and
its legal protection. Part III highlights some of the difficulties the
courts encountered in applying copyright infringement standards to
computer software cases. It also summarizes certain proposals for
changes to the copyright standards. Part IV draws the conclusion that
the underlying reason for the judicial uncertainty is that copyright law
is inherently inapplicable to machine language software. This is because (1) such software is utilitarian in nature, and (2) it does not meet
the constitutional requirement for public disclosure. Part V explores alternatives to copyright protection, ruling out patent protection and sui
generis legislation. The Article concludes that machine language
software is best protected under trade secrecy law. Trade secrecy affords a level and scope of protection which is most consistent with preserving incentives and encouraging competition.
II.

COMPUTER SOFTWARE TECHNOLOGY AND ITS
PROTECTION

To understand copyright law as it applies to computer software, the
reader should be somewhat familiar with computer software technology. This section gives a brief sketch of the history of computer
software, an overview of software technology, and an introductory overview of the legal protection of computer programs.
A.

History

Commercial development of computer technology has occurred almost entirely in the post-World War II era.7 The early computers consisted entirely of hardware. Their circuits were physically configured
("hardwired") to carry out a specific task. Changing the task involved
physically rewiring the computer's internals, a process both difficult
and time consuming. By contrast, modern computers are truly universal machines able to perform a virtually endless set of tasks. While a
7. Construction of the first modern-day computer, Electronic Numerical Integrator

and Calculator (ENIAC), was completed in 1946. 4 THE NEW

ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA

1046 (15th ed. 1984).
To date computer technology has passed through several basic technological phases.
The four generations of computer hardware are based on vacuum tubes, transistors,
printed circuits, and finally integrated circuits. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEw TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 9-11 (1979) [hereinafter CONTU
Report].
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modern computer's hardware configuration is largely fixed, the computer can obtain its instructions from user-written sets of instructions
known as computer programs or software. s Substituting software for
much of the original hardware immeasurably increased the usefulness
of computers and made them the all-pervasive technological workhorses
of today.
Until fairly recently, software was developed exclusively by hardware manufacturers for distribution as part of the overall computer system. The present software development industry was born when the
above practice, known as bundling, came to an end in the late 1960's. 9
Any person with the appropriate level of expertise could enter the
software business with a relatively small capital investment. Opening
the software industry to pervasive competition led to explosive growth
in the software market and is largely responsible for the computer industry's phenomenal growth.
B.

Technology

Creating software is a multi-step process. At the outset, the
software designer identifies objectives and selects a general approach.
Then, he plans the program's structure and organization, often using
flow charts or word descriptions. Next, he transforms, or codes, the
program structure and algorithms into computer language. 10 Most programmers code using one of the high level computer languages. Computer instructions written in these languages are known as source code.
High level computer languages consist of English-like commands which
are easily comprehensible to programmers but which the computer cannot use directly. For the computer to use the software, the source code
must be converted to machine readable form, variously known as
machine code or object code, which is incomprehensible to the programmer. Source code is automatically converted into object code through
the use of specialized computer programs called compilers or interpreters. Virtually all mass distribution, currently sold software is distributed in the form of machine or object code."
8. "A computer program is a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or
indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1980).
9. IBM announced unbundling in 1969. Bender, Computer Software Licensing, in
COMPUTER SorrwARE AND CHiPs 1986: PROTECTION AND MARKETING 405, 417 (M.D.

Goldberg ed. 1986).
10. At various stages in the software development, the programmer must test the
program to insure that it operates properly and is error free. This debugging usually is
more time consuming than the actual writing of source code. Corley and Bryan, A Unifying Theory of the Litigation of Computer Software Copyright Cases, 63 N.C. L. REv. 563,
566-67 (1985).
11. Some software packages are copy protected, or technologically locked, to make it
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Software can be divided into three basic classes. Most familiar to
the general public are application programs. Application program can
carry out particular, often complex, tasks such as word processing or
database management.
A second class of software consists of operating systems. Unlike application programs, operating systems are largely invisible to the user.
They control the housekeeping tasks of the computer, allocating memory as needed and routing signals from the keyboard and from application programs to the proper internal computer destinations. Operating
systems interface between the application programs and the computer
hardware, making it possible for a computer to accommodate a variety
of application programs.
The third class of software is closely related to hardware. Computer hardware consists of a series of integrated circuits known as
chips. Chips are highly complex, yet remarkably miniaturized, electrical circuits that perform a variety of basic functions. These functions
are marshalled by the application programs, through the operating system, to achieve such complex tasks as word processing. While the integrated circuits, which make up the computer, are essentially hardware
elements, chip designers usually allow for some flexibility by designing
the capability of obtaining certain basic functions from a set of coded instructions into the chip. These instructions, called microcode, comprise
the third basic type of software. Microcode consists of software instructions, yet it is used to change the basic operation of hardware elements.
Hence, microcode falls somewhere between software and hardware.
This ambivalence is reflected in the term firmware, which is often used
to refer to microcode.- 2
C.

Legal Protection

Copyright protection is sanctioned by the Constitution. 13 Congress
passed the first copyright statute in 1790,14 but the last thorough revision was in 1976.15 The requirements for copyrightable works are considerably less rigorous than those for patentable works. To be
difficult for a user to create unauthorized copies. However, even software which is not
copy protected is in compiled form which prevents the user from inspecting or making
changes to the code.
12. Patterson, Microprogramming, 248 Sci. AM. 50 (Mar. 1983); Schmidt, Legal Proprietary Interest in Computer Programs: The American Erperience, 21 JuIMErmcs J.
345, 350-51 (1981).
13. "The Congress shall have Power .... To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the executive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
14. M. Kramer Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 432 (4th Cir. 1986).
15. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1982).
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copyrightable, a work must be original. Hence, it must have been independently developed rather than copied, and it must be fixed in some
medium.' 6 The copyright law provides the author of a qualifying work
with certain rights, such as the right to reproduce, to prepare derivative
17
works, and to distribute copies.
Computer programs have enjoyed copyright protection for a
number of years despite lingering doubts about the ability to copyright
certain forms of software. In 1964, the Register of Copyright first accepted, albeit reluctantly, software for registration.' 8 Yet, somehow,
Congress construed the Copyright Office's grudging acceptance as a
wholehearted endorsement of the copyrightability of software. This
misconception led to the enactment of laws formalizing the copyright16. "Copyright protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later developed,
from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or a device." Id. § 102(a).
Commentators generally agree that "originality" should mean
only that the work owes its origin to the author, i.e., is independently created and
not copied from other works.... Originality sufficient for copyright protection
exists if the "author" has introduced any element of novelty as contrasted with
the material previously known to him.
Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1971).
The Act defines fixation as follows.
A work is "fixed" in a tangible medium of expression when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, by or under the authority of the author, is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration. A work consisting of sounds,
images, or both, that are being transmitted, is "fixed" for purposes of this title...
if a fixation of the work is being made simultaneously with its transmission.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
17. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
18. The registrability of computer programs involves two basic questions: (1) whether
the program as such is the "writing of an author" . . . and (2) whether a reproduction of
the program in a form actually used to operate or to be "read" by a machine is a "copy"
that can be accepted for copyright registration. Both of these are doubtful questions.
However, in accordance with its policy of resolving doubtful issues in favor of registrations whenever possible, the Copyright Office will consider registration for a computer
program [to be protected by copyright laws] if(1) The elements of assembling, selecting, arranging, editing, and literary expression that went into the compilation of the program are sufficient to constitute original authorship.
(2) The program has been published, with the required copyright notice; that is,
"copies" (i.e., reproductions of the program in a form perceptible or capable
of being made perceptible to the human eye) bearing the notice have been
distributed or made available to the public.
(3) The copies deposited for registration consist of or include reproductions in a
language intelligible to human beings. If the only publication was in a form
that cannot be perceived visually or read, something more (e.g., a print-out
of the entire program) would also have to be deposited.
OFFICE OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS, ANNouNcEMENT SMI.47 (May 1964), reprinted
in COPYRIGHT OF7CE CIRcuLAR 310 (Jan. 1965).
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ability of software and is indirectly responsible for the confusion evidenced in the courts in recent years. In 1980, on the recommendation of
the congressionally appointed Commission On New Technological Uses
of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU"), 19 Congress amended the 1976 Act to
establish unambiguously the copyrightability of computer software. 2°
While both the CONTU report and the 1980 amendments left unresolved which aspects of software were protectible, recent court decisions extend copyright protection to an increasing array of software
formats. Courts apply copyright protection to source code, machine or
object code, and object code embedded internally on semiconductor2
2
chips. 21 Judicial decisions also extend protection to operating systems.
Microcode was also recently awarded copyright protection.2
III.

COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE

Recent judicial copyright infringement decisions highlight the inappropriateness of protecting machine language computer software with
copyright law. Infringement can be proved by showing that the plaintiff owned a valid copyright and the defendant copied the protected
work. 24 When available, copying may be shown by direct evidence.
When evidence of direct copying is unavailable, as in most cases, copying can be established by showing that the defendant had access to the
copyrighted work and that the allegedly infringing work is substantially
25
similar to the original.
Judge Learned Hand expressed the essence of the substantial similarity test in Nichols v. UniversalPictures Corp.:26
Upon any work ... a greater number of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of the incident is left out.
The last may perhaps be no more than the most general statement of
19. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 1.
20. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-117 (1982).
21. Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 751 (N.D. Ill. 1983). Accord Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (3d Cir. 1983), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir.
1982).
22. Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1251.
23. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., F. Supp. 590, 595 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
24. See Sid & Marty Krofft Television Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d
1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 1977); Reyher v. Children's Television Workshop, 533 F.2d 87, 90 (2d
Cir. 1976); 2 M. NiMMmR, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 141, at 610-11 (1976).

25. Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1162. But see Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental
Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1232 n.23 (3d Cir. 1986), cert denied, - U.S. -, 107 S.Ct.
877 (1987) ("[E]ven the showing of substantial similarity is not dispositive, for it is still
open to the alleged infringer to prove that his work is an original creation .... The cause
of the substantial similarity-legitimate or not-is a question of fact.").
26. 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930).
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what the [work] is about . . . but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise the [author] could prevent the use of his "ideas," to which, apart from their
expression, his property is never extended.
Like numerous other legal concepts, substantial similarity lacks mathematical precision. As Judge Hand himself noted, "[n]obody has ever
been able to fix that boundary, and nobody ever can." 7
A modern description of the substantial similarity test can be found
in Sid & Marty Krofft. 2s The court described a bifurcated test consisting of two separate inquiry phases. In the extrinsic phase of the inquiry, the factfinder determines, with the aid of expert testimony,
whether the ideas of the two works are similar. If the works contain
similar ideas, the factfinder then inquires whether the expressions of
the two works are substantially similar. In this intrinsic phase of the
inquiry, the factfinder uses an ordinary reasonable person (or average
reasonable reader or spectator) standard and not expert testimony.29
In traditional copyright infringement suits, substantial similarity is
determined by viewing the disputed works through the eyes of an ordinary observer without the aid of expert testimony. 30 However, applying
the ordinary observer standard to computer software cases presents
many problems. 3' Most juries and judges perceive computer technology
as complex and mysterious. The average lay person is unfamiliar with
computers. Even if the test utilized a computer-literate observer standard, it is unhelpful to the decisionmaker since the most important protectible element in a computer software copyright is not the visual
output, which an ordinary observer would see while using the program,
but rather the machine language code. In the form of machine lan27. Id.
28. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
29. Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. A problem may arise when the factfinder is
the same person in both phases of the test. In this case, "that person has been exposed to
expert evidence in the first step, yet she or he is supposed to ignore or 'forget' that evidence in analyzing the problem under the second step. Especially in complex cases, we
doubt that the 'forgetting' can be effective when the expert testimony is essential to even
the most fundamental understanding of the objects in question." Whelan, 797 F.2d at
1232-33.
30. Nichols, 45 F.2d at 123. One of the goals of copyright law is to protect the originator of copyrightable material from those who would gain an unfair economic advantage by
improperly using his material. Allowing the ordinary observer to decide whether or not
two works are substantially similar places the decisions in the hands of the type of person
who would make the all important economic decision in the market place.' Expert testimony would merely confuse the issue by highlighting obscure similarities and differences
which may be totally irrelevant to the ultimate consumer.

31. The ordinary observer test has proven "one of the most difficult questions in
copyright law, and one which is the least susceptible of helpful generalization." M. NIMMmR, supra note 24, § 13.03[A].
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guage code, the protectible expression is incomprehensible not only to
the ordinary person, i.e., the judge and the jury, but also to computer
experts. Perhaps because they sensed this difficulty, several courts
eliminated the ordinary observer requirement for computer software
cases.3 2 One commentator proposed that the test be modified by using
an "iterative" substantial similarity test which would substitute expert
testimony for the ordinary observer test.33 Several courts adopted this
modified substantial similarity test in software infringement cases. 34
Difficulties in applying the substantial similarity test to software
are not limited to the inadequacy of the ordinary observer standard. A
more fundamental difficulty exists. Under the traditional substantial
similarity test, copyright infringement is not limited to literal and exact
reproduction of the original work.35 The copying does not need to be
comprehensive to be infringing.36 Rather, substantial similarity is
found where the generalized ideas in the two works are the same and
the expression is substantially similar.37 Taken at face value, a computer program infringes if it contains the same generalized idea as some
38
pre-existing software and is expressed in substantially the same way.
While some courts accept this conclusion, 39 other courts and many com32. Note, Copyright Infringement of Computer Programs: A Modification of the SubstantialSimilarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1264, 1265 (1984).
33. Id. at 1285-88.
34. E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1492 (D. Minn. 1985);
Hubco Data Products Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q 450 (D. Idaho
Feb. 3, 1983).
35. "It is of course essential to any protection of literary property... that the right
cannot be limited literally to the text, else a plagiarist would escape by immaterial variations." Nichols, 45 F.2d at 121. See also Berkic v. Crichton, 761 F.2d 1289, 1292-93 (9th Cir.
1985) (sequence of events in literary work can be copyrightable); West Publishing Co. v.
Mead Data Cent., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 1571, 1576-77 (D. Minn. 1985) (arrangement and pagination of West reporters is copyrightable); Meredith Corp. v. Harper & Row, Publishers,
Inc., 378 F. Supp. 686, 689, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (creating a psychology textbook by working
from a detailed outline of another book infringes that work's copyright).
36. Nimmer identifies two ways in which a work might be substantially similar to another: comprehensive nonliteral similarity and fragmented literal similarity. Comprehensive nonliteral similarity occurs when there is "a similarity not just as to a particular line
or paragraph or other minor segment, but [when] the fundamental essence or structure of
one work is duplicated in another." Fragmented literal similarity occurs when there is
occasional, but not complete, word-for-word similarity. M. NIMMER, supra note 24,
§§ 13.03[A]-13.20.1.-.2. "The question of the substantiality of the similarity is... a question
of fact; the piracy of even a quantitatively small fragment (' a rose by any other name
would smell as sweet') may be qualitatively substantial." Roy Export Co. Establishment
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137, 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 672 F.2d
1095 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982).
37. Sid & Marty Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164.
38. See Note, Copyright Protectionfor Computer Flow Logic and Algorithms, 5 CoMPuTER L.J. 257, 276 (1984).
39. See in~fra notes 47-57 and accompanying text.
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mentators find it very troubling. The application of the substantial similarity test to software is so problematic that many courts decline to use
the test, creating instead ad hoc tests which they find more comfortable.4° The judicial confusion and uncertainty that result from the unclear tests have a highly deleterious effect on the computer industry.
Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing CO. 4 1 represents one of the earliest software copyright infringement decisions.
Synercom marketed a highly successful structural engineering analysis
software package. 42 University Computing, wishing to market its own
software to accomplish the same purpose, independently developed a
competing program. 43 To compete more effectively, the new software
had to be compatible with the market-leading Synercom program. 44
University Computing achieved this compatibility by adopting the
Synercom input format. This format was adopted by structuring the
program so that the sequence and format of its user inputs would be
identical to those of the Synercom program. 45 Therefore, it was possible for a user of the new software to run input files used with the
Synercom program without altering the data. Synercom claimed that
University Computing's use of the identical input format infringed its
software copyright. The court disagreed, stating that form and expression constitute copyrightable expression in literary and artistic works
but not in software.
If order and sequence is the expression, the skilled effort is not separable, for the form, arrangement, and combination is itself the intellectual conception involved. It would follow that only to the extent the
expressions involve stylistic creativity above and beyond the bare expression of sequence and arrangement, should they be protected ....
[I]n the usual case sequence, choice, and arrangement have only stylistic significance, rather than constituting as they would here, the es46
sence of the expression.
The court in Whelan 47 reached a contrary conclusion. Jaslow Dental Laboratories hired Whelan, a computer programmer, to create
software that would automate the management of Jaslow. Whelan
spent time with Jaslow personnel to learn the operation of the business.
40. One commentator argues that several courts have given the substantial similarity
test only secondary consideration with primary attention being focused on the use of the
original program to create a competing product. Compare Gesmer, Deveorpments in the
Law of Computer Software Copyright Infringement, 26 JuRIMErRIcs J. 224, 231 (1984).
41. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
42. Id. at 1006.
43. Id. at 1008.
44. Id. at 1009.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 1014.
47. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1222.
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She then created a software system and delivered it to Jaslow.4 8 Jaslow
subsequently hired a second consultant to recreate the Whelan software
to run on a different and more popular computer system. 49 When Jaslow began marketing the new system, Whelan, who had copyrighted the
original system, sued Jaslow for copyright infringement. Though Jaslow had access to the source code, 5° his software was programmed using
an entirely different language than Whelan's in order to accommodate a
different computer. Therefore, the two programs were quite dissimilar
in literal detail. Whelan charged, however, that while Jaslow had not
literally copied her program, he did copy its overall structure and organization. 5 ' As a result, the two programs were very similar in their
file structure, screen outputs, and subroutine configuration.5 2 The court
paid lip service to the bifurcated substantial similarity test, but neglected to carry out the two part test.s3 Instead, the court devised its
own test. It asked whether the program's structure and organization
were essential to the expression of the program's idea as the computerized management of a dental laboratory and found the particular expression of that idea in Whelan's program just one of many possible
expressions. The court concluded that since the structure and organization were not essential to the idea, they were protectible expression
under copyright law. 54
The Whelan court distinguished the Synercom decision by noting
that the structure in question in Synercom was much simpler than the
structure in Whelan. The Wrhelan court implied that there may have
been very few ways of arranging the input formats in Synercom.5
However, the Synercom court went out of its way to state that order
and sequence do not constitute expression.5 The Whelan court disagreed citing as precedent the holding in SAS Inst., Inc. v. S & H Computer Sys., Inc. 57 However, the Whelan court's reliance on SAS may
have been misplaced since more than mere structure and organization
were involved in SAS. The SAS court was heavily influenced by its
finding of literal copying of code by the defendant. 5s
Other decisions on the copyrightability of structure and organiza48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 1226.
at 1227.
at 1232 n.22.
at 1233.
Id. at 1228.
Id. at 1232.
Id. at 1238-39.
Id. at 1239-40.
Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013.
605 F. Supp. 816, 830 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (structure and precedent are protectible).
SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 826.
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tion are equally confusing and inconsistent. O-Co Indus. v. Hoffman,59
is factually similar to Whelan, yet the outcome was completely different. As employees of the plaintiff, the defendants developed a computerized speech prompting system for the plaintiff. Subsequently, they
developed a similar program on their own. The plaintiff sued for copyright infringement. As in Whelan, the new system had little or no literal similarity to the original. It was developed for a different computer
system and used a different computer language. The two systems displayed substantial similarity in structure and organization. 6° Whereas
the Whelan court held that such similarity constituted infringement,
the O-Co court found that only idea and not expression had been appro61
priated, and hence there was no infringement.
Various courts have followed and rejected the Whelan rationale.
The recent court of appeals decision in Plains Cotton CooperativeAssoc.
v. Goodpasture Computer Service, Inc. 6 2 specifically declined to follow
the Whelan decision. The facts were similar to those in Whelan and 0Co. A former employer sued former employees who developed a competing software package using a different computer language for copyright infringement. 63 Again, no direct copying was alleged or even
possible. Rather, the plaintiff accused the defendants of "organizational
copying." 4 The court, in rejecting Plains' request for a preliminary injunction, chose to follow the Synercom reasoning rather than that of
65
Whelan.
In another recent case, Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World,
Inc.,66 the court, purporting to follow Whelan, appears to have misconstrued Whelan's holding. The controversy in Broderbund involved the
alleged infringement of Broderbund's copyright on its Print Shop
software.6 7 The court concluded that the defendant infringed the
Broderbund software copyright after considering the appearance and se6
quence of the two software systems' menu screens. 8
The court explicitly expressed a preference for the Whelan holding
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
before

625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
Id. at 614.
Id. at 616.
807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 U.S. 80 (1987).
Id. at 1259.
Id. at 1260.
However, the court tempered its preference by noting that since the motion
it was one for a preliminary injunction, it did not feel obligated to probe the depths

of the case's merit. Id. at 1262.
66. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).

67. Both Broderbund's Print Shop and Unison's Printmaster software created custom
made greeting cards. The Printmaster screens were virtually identical with those of Print
Shop. Id. at 1137.
68. Id. at 1133.
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over that of Synercom;69 however, the Broderbund analysis, based
largely on the menu screens, confuses the issues. The screens are an independent creation and have little to do with the underlying program. 70
The audiovisual outputs of computer programs are properly copyrightable, independent of the software which created them.71 It should
make no difference whether a copyrightable entity is produced with the
aid of a pen, pencil, or computer. The Broderbund court apparently
misinterpreted the Whelan ruling as suggesting that "copyright protection is not limited to the literal aspects of a computer program, but
rather that it extends to the overall structure of a program, including
its audiovisual displays." 72
The court in Digital Communications Assocs. v. Softklone Distrib.
Corp.7 3 adopted an opposite view. It specifically rejected the
not extend to
Broderbundholding. A computer program copyright does
74
the screens. The screens are separately copyrightable.
69. Id. at 1132. The defendant's conduct may have influenced the court. The defendant cooperated with the plaintiff on a joint project, thereby gaining ready access to the
plaintiff's operation, and subsequently abandoned the joint venture to compete with the
plaintiff. Id. at 1130-31.
70. See Davidson, Common Law, Uncommon Software, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1037, 1103
(1986) (arguing that what Whelan really held is that "when the source of a functionally
similar program is the code of the original [program] similarities in the external aspects of
the two programs is evidence of underlying similarity in the internal aspects.").
71. Audiovisual works are defined as works that consist of a series of related
images which are intrinsically intended to be shown by the use of machines or
devices such as projectors, viewers, or electronic equipment, together with accompanying sounds, if any, regardless of the nature of the material objects, such as
films or tapes, in which the works are embodied.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982). See also Kramer, 783 F.2d at 441; Strohon, 564 F. Supp. at 749. To
be copyrightable, an audiovisual work must meet copyright requirements. Thus, in
Broderbund,648 F. Supp. at 1134, unlike in Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1014, the screens
were "aesthetically pleasing" and contained "stylistic creativity above and beyond the bare
expression."
72. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1133. The Broderbund court understandably misconstrued the Whelan holding. The district court in Whelan noted that the two programs'
screen displays were very similar, although it did add that such similarities have only probative value. "Insofar as everything that a computer does, including its screen outputs, is
related to the program that operate it, there is necessarily a causal relationship between
the program and the screen outputs. The screen outputs must bear some relation to the
underlying programs, and therefore they have some probative value." Whelan, 797 F.2d
at 1244.
The court in Digital Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F.
Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987) used a similar argument. The confusion is not limited to the
courtroom. One commentator recommended that the screens should not be independently copyrightable, but rather should be copyrightable as part of the program under the
unit publication doctrine. Conley and Bryan, supra note 10, at 581.
73. 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (plaintiff had copyrighted the manual and the
programs as well as the display screens).
74. Id. at 455.
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The court in Kramer took a more perplexing stand on audiovisual
outputs of computer programs. The court reasoned that since the audiovisuals can be reproduced from the program, the latter must be a copy
75
of the former. Thus the copyright on audiovisuals protects the ROM 76
based program as well as the audiovisuals.
As evident from this brief anthology of recent cases, the substantial
similarity test confounds many courts. The confusion has inspired various authors to suggest alternative tests. One author replaces the substantial similarity test with a "surprising similarity" test.77 Another
commentator suggests that the courts abandon altogether the substantial similarity test: "Liability should not depend on substantial similarity between the copyrighted work and a particular version of the
allegedly infringing work; rather, it should depend on whether the defendant has engaged in conduct that infringes any of the plaintiff's ex'78
clusive statutory rights.
The confusion over applying the substantial similarity test to computer software intensified on January 12, 1987 due to three related
events. First, the United States Supreme Court denied the petition for
certiorari in the Whelan case. The other two events were the filings of
75. ROM stands for Read Only Memory. ROM consists of instructions which reside
in the computer and cannot be changed by the user, i.e., they can only be read by the computer and cannot normally be erased or overwritten. Wharton, Use and Erpression: The
Scope of Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs, 5 COMPUTER L.J. 433, 436 (1986).
76. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 445.
77. "mo determine underlying similarity, find evidence which reflects a surprising,
improbable number of similar discretionary choices between two programs which are supposed to share only functional similarities." Davidson, supra note 70, at 1086.
78. Conley and Bryan, supra note 10, at 608. Basing infringement on conduct would
focus on the alleged infringer's behavior and motivation. A number of courts seem to
have based their decisions, in part, on the parties' conduct. For example, in Whelan the
defendant had access to the source code, which made the similarity of the two programs
highly suspicious. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232. Similarly, in Broderbund the plaintiff produced evidence of direct copying. Broderbund, 648 F. Supp. at 1135. In Kramer the two
programs were virtually identical. The defendant had, however, included certain cosmetic
dissimilarities which the court found to be the result of a deliberate effort to make minor
distinctions between the programs. Kramer, 783 F.2d at 446. The court in E.F. Johnson
found and carefully described a long series of similarities which had no rational basis for
existence and which convinced the court that the original program had been copied. E.F.
Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1493-98. In Williams v. Arndt, 626 F. Supp. 571, 579 (D. Mass.
1985), the court found infringement based largely on a weighing of the relative credibilities of the opposing parties. Finally, in SAS the court found the defendant's conduct
faulty. S&H had obtained and systematically used the original SAS source code in a manner contrary to the terms of the licensing agreement. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 821. But see
Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protectionfor Computer Software, 38 STAN. L.
REv. 497, 515 (1986) (criticizing the "conduct" approach of Conley, preferring a structural
test, as in Whelan, over a course of development tests where the conduct of the parties as
well as intermediate versions of the allegedly infringing software are included in the
evidence).
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a pair of copyright infringement suits by Lotus Development against
producers of two clones of Lotus's highly successful 1-2-3 spreadsheet
program. 79 The Lotus suits accuse Mosaic and Paperback Software,
vendors of The Twin and VP-Planner, respectively, of attempting to
"deliberately recreate, with only trivial variations, the 'look and feel'
and user interface of Lotus 1-2-3."80
The Lotus suits are similar to Whelan, but with one difference. In
Whelan, the current high water mark in the application of copyright
protection to computer software, the court based its decision on the substantial similarity of the organization and structure of the two programs. However, the court took notice of, and was probably influenced
by, the fact that the defendant had access to the original program
source code. 8l In contrast, the defendants in the Lotus suits are not accused of having access to the 1-2-3 source code, and Lotus does not accuse the defendants of any breach of a confidential relationship. The
relationship between the plaintiffs and defendants was that of a manufacturer and a retail purchaser of personal computer software.
The difference between Whelan and the Lotus suits, while ostensibly minute, is highly significant. Viewed in the context of the copyright
protection of non-software works, the Lotus claim would not raise any
eyebrows. With some modifications and enhancements, the two clones
reproduce the 1-2-3 program. They seem to display the "concept and
feel"8 2 of 1-2-3. Under traditional copyright law this process could easily constitute infringement. Jim Manzi, President of Lotus Development, stated that what the defendants have done is "no different than
for someone to plagiarize Gone with the Wind, and then merely add a
new concluding chapter."8 3
79. Lotus Dev. v. Paperback Software, No. xx-xxx (D. Mass. filed Jan. 12, 1987); Lotus Dev. v. Mosaic Software, No. xx-xxx (D. Mass. filed Jan 12, 1987). The suits charge
copyright infringement, false advertising, and unfair trade practices and seek $10 million
in punitive damages plus unspecified actual damages. Info World, Jan. 19, 1987, at 1, col.

3.
80. Info World, Jan. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 3. The suits allege that the defendant's products also copied "names used for various commands and functions ... and sequence." Id.
at. col. 4. Subsequent to filing the suits, the Copyright Office denied Lotus audiovisual
copyrights on the 1-2-3 screens, because the screens consisted mostly of text, not graphics,
and were not deemed unique. Info World, Mar. 9, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
In a related suit, Visicalc, the originator of the computer spreadsheet concept, filed
suit against Lotus seeking $100 million for theft of technology and infringement of copyright of screens and images. Info World, Apr. 13, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
81. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232.
82. The term "concept and feel" first arose in Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card
Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970).
83. Info World, Mar. 30, 1987, at 8, col. 1. However, to Adam Osborne, President of
defendant Paperback Software, Lotus' action is "a naked grab by the current industry
leader to prevent legitimate price and performance competition." rd. at col. 4.
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The Lotus suits are critically important, because should Lotus prevail, copyright protection will be extended for the first time to abstract
functions, algorithms, business practices, and processes.8 4 However, this
result would be inconsistent with sound public policy. The public policy
reason for protecting computer software is to provide developers with
proper incentives to produce software without, at the same time, giving
them a strangehold on the markets 5 The social bargain between
software developers and society at large must not be allowed to become
unbalanced. 86 An extremely loose standard for finding substantial similarity between programs will inhibit industry innovation and
87
competition.
Computer software deserves a certain degree of protection. By nature, the actual writing of software code is relatively easy compared
with the development of the overall structure, logic, and algorithms including the debugging, documentation, and maintenanceas It would be
grossly unfair to the original developer and would greatly inhibit
software development to allow the literal copying and subsequent sale
of software. A programmer should, however, be free to study a piece of
software and to incorporate any ideas he may glean from normal usage
89
into his own work.
84. "The harder case than Whelan Associates would be where the defendant never
looked at the code of the original program but nevertheless mimicked the user interface.
No infringement of the underlying program should be found in such a case. Otherwise,
copyright would be extended to protect more than the manner in which the program was
written; it would then protect some of the abstract functions, algorithms, business practices, and process the program is automating." Davidson, supra note 70, at 1103 (footnote
omitted).
85. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1237.
86. [W]e must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the
one, that men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the
community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward for their
ingenuity and labor; the other, that the would may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the arts retarded.
Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1235 n.27 (quoting Sayre v. Moore, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 140 n.6 (1785)).
87. Because the computer software industry progresses by a "stepping-stone improvement process, with each innovation building on past innovations to produce an improved
product," too loose an application of the substantial similarity test could in effect require
software engineers to "start from scratch" in order to achieve technological progress.
Note, supra note 32, at 1291. Also, the courts must be careful not to protect material already in the public domain. "If the underlying work is itself protected by copyright, then
the copyright in the derivative work or collection will neither nullify nor extend the protection accorded to the underlying work. If the underlying work is in the public domain,
a copyright in the derivative work will not render the underlying work protectible." M.
NIMMER, supra note 24, § 3.04.
88. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1231.
89. "[C]opyright protection for programs does not threaten to block the use of ideas
or program language previously developed by others when that use is necessary to achieve
a certain result. When other language is available, programmers are free to read copy-
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If at all, most software programs improve the state of the art only
by tiny increments. Progress in the computer field is evolutionary
rather than revolutionary. The over-protection of software forces subsequent developers to reinvent the wheel each time they wish to make
an incremental improvement in the technology. Over-protection breeds
inefficiencies and discourages innovation while it induces technological
stagnation. A programmer wishing to improve existing software is unlikely to undertake to create the original software. He knows that it
will consume an inordinate amount of time to recreate, in an unrecognizable form, a system which already exists. He is also aware that
even after painstakingly creating the new system, he is unlikely to sell
enough copies to recoup his investment. Additionally, members of the
user community will be reluctant to abandon their hard-earned skills in
using the market's leading software to relearn new ways of accomplishing the same tasks with the new software. 90 Compatibility is often crucial for the commercial success of new software because many users
have large investments, not only in skills and expertise, but also in customized software developed using the commercial software. A potential
user is unlikely to be interested in new software if it is incompatible
with the market leader.91
righted programs and use the ideas embodied in them in preparing their own works."
CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 20. See also Affiliated Hosp. Prods., Inc. v. Merdel Game
Mfg. Co., 513 F.2d 1183 (2d Cir. 1975) (no copyright infringement where the defendant did
not copy game book verbatim and made "a good faith attempt to improve upon and clarify
the presentation of the rules").
Dan Bricklin, co-creator of Visicalc, the forerunner of Lotus 1-2-3, stated that most
developers "are aghast at borrowing code; they wouldn't consider doing that. In general,
software advances by evolution. There are revolutionary steps but lots of things are done
through evolution. It occurs whenever someone has to rewrite from scratch and that person's ego gets involved. You never copy exactly; you always embellish because of your
ego. That's how we get the genetic mutation that makes evolution. Then you test the
product in the marketplace to see if that mutation is good enough." PC WEEK, May 1987,
at 26. Recreating a program in a different computer language "requires substantial imagination, creativity, independent thought, and exercise of discretion, and the resulting program can in no way be said to be merely a copy or version of the problem statement. The
program and the statement are so different, both in physical characteristics and in intended purpose, that they are really two different expressions of the same idea, rather
than to different versions of the same expression." Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013 n.5.
90. The Synercom court makes this point by analogy with the familiar figure-H pattern for automobile gear shifts. Several other convenient configurations can be imagined.
The original pattern selection was largely arbitrary but has long since become a standard.
Use of such a standard is socially desirable, because it reduces the amount of restraining
required. The pattern cannot be copyrighted, but descriptions of the pattern, like those
found in car manuals, including photographs, are copyrightable. Synercom, 462 F. Supp.
at 1013. According to Dan Bricklin, if Lotus should win, every software interface will
have to be different. "The restraining costs alone are going to be in the billions of dollars." Info World, Jan. 19, 1987, at 8, col. 1.
91. The defendant in Synercom designed its competing program to achieve compati-
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While compatibility is desirable, literal software copying to achieve
compatibility cannot be condoned.92 Compatibility can, however, be
achieved without literal copying. Examples of compatible computer
products that incrementally improve the technology of existing products abound. 93 Extending copyright protection to the software's structure and organization, or look and feel, would greatly inhibit
compatibility and standardization in the computer software industry.
This extension also risks the smothering of an industry with tremendous impact on virtually every aspect of modern life. While the
software industry would, if uninhibited, progress in a series of tiny technological steps building on previous knowledge and expertise, an ill-considered judicial decision could stifle significant innovation in the
industry and create a pernicious atmosphere. In such an atmosphere, in
the wry words of one observer, "[i]f you are going to see farther than
others, make sure you're not standing on the shoulders of any giants." 94
IV.

THE COPYRIGHTABILITY OF COMPUTER SOFTWARE

Applying copyright law to machine language software 95 is inappropriate and poses the danger of corrupting and eroding longstanding
copyright principles. 96 Two fundamental constitutional difficulties arise
in using copyright law to protect machine readable software. First, such
software is a utilitarian work, not the constitutionally mandated "Writings." 97 Furthermore, machine language code does not communicate to
human beings, rendering moot the disclosure requirement which is part
of the social contract forming the underlying constitutional basis for
copyright protection-the promotion of "Science and Useful Arts."98
An understanding of how machine language software became copyrightable is useful in analyzing the appropriateness of applying copybility through a simple input method. Like Lotus 1-2-3, which is partly based on Visicaic,
the Synercom program itself was based partly on the earlier IBM FRAN software.
Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1006-08.
92. See SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 826. (By appropriating the SAS code, S&H avoided the
cost involved with false starts. The benefits are not unlike those accruing from stealing
the architectural plans of a building and proceeding to build according to the plans.); see
also E.F. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1503 ("[Ihe mere fact that defendant set out with the
objective of creating an LTR-compatible radio does not... excuse its copying of plaintiff's
code.").
93. Machrone, Roots. The Evolution of Innovation, PC MAGAZINE 166-74 (May 26,
1987).
94. Id. at 166.
95. The term "machine language software" is used here to include object code and
microcode, but not source code. Source code is, and should remain, copyrightable.
96. See infra notes 109-55 and accompanying text.
97. See U.S. CONST. art. I,

98. Id.

§ 8.
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right protection to software. Of course, the Copyright Act of 1909 was
silent about the copyrightability of computer software. In 1964, the
Register of the Copyright Office declared that copyright registration of
computer software would be permitted under the rule of doubt, 99 provided that a copy of the software, in human readable form, is deposited
with the Register. 1'0 The Register had serious misgivings about the
copyrightability of software, specifically whether such works represented "writings" and whether machine readable versions were copies
of the original program. 1 1
The 1976 Act, while not specifically mentioning software, effected
changes which ostensibly removed certain obstacles in the way of the
copyright protection for software. Specifically, the requirements of publication, registration, and direct human readability were significantly
modified, almost deleted. 10 2 In enacting the 1976 Act, Congress left
open the question of the copyrightabiity of computer software pending
the recommendations of the Commission On the New Technological
Uses of Copyrighted Works ("CONTU"). l0 3 The Commission did not issue its report until 1978. Congress utilized CONTU's recommendations
in 1980 to amend the Copyright Act. While the Commission claimed
not to have been bound by indications that Congress favored copyright
protection for software, 1' 4 CONTU seems to have presupposed the
10 5
copyrightabiity of computer software.
In its report, the Commission apparently limited itself to existing
16
forms of protection and found copyright the least inappropriate.
CONTU recommended extending copyright protection to computer
software, 10 7 but made little attempt to define precisely what forms of
99. UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT OMCE, COPYRIGHT REGISTRATION FOR COMPUTER

PROGRAMS (1964), reprinted in 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 361 (1964).
100. Id. See supra note 18.
101. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 15.
102. Id. at 15.
103. Commissioner Hersey contended that Congress had not clearly intended to extend copyright protection to software. CONTU assumed that the 1976 Act extended copyright protection to software when, in fact, Congress was looking to CONTU to render a
judgment on the subject. Id. at 31 (Hersey, Comm'r, dissenting). Although the 1980 Act
included a definition of computer program, it did not explicitly state that software is copyrightable. Note, supra note 1, at 246.
104. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 16.
105. "[I]t is clear that those who wrote the Copyright Act of 1976 ... concur in the
position that programs are copyrightable. Action by either Congress or the courts would
be necessary to change this." Id. at 16.
106. Id. at 16-18.
107. The new copyright law [should] be amended: (1) to make it explicit that computer programs, to the extent that they embody an author's original creation, are proper
subject matter of copyright; (2) to apply to all computer uses of copyrighted programs by
the deletion of the present section 117; and (3) to ensure that rightful possessors of copies
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software should be protected. The Commission preferred to leave it to
the courts to make fine distinctions among various manifestations of
programs.108 CONTU took the position that copyright protection would
not be denied to software simply because a work featured utilitarian aspects.'i 9 This view disregards major tenets of copyright law and is contrary to previously expressed Congressional intent." 0 Extending
copyright protection to utilitarian works raises serious constitutional
questions. The Constitutional mandate"' to Congress calls for the establishment of two distinct forms of intellectual property rights-one
i2
for useful works (patents) and one for writings (copyright)."
of computer programs by use or adapt these copies for their use. Id. at 1. Commissioner
Hersey dissented. His recommendation was that "Itihe Act of 1976 should be amended to
make it explicit that copyright protection does not extend to a computer program in the
form in which it is capable of being used to control computer operations. Id.
108. Most infringements, at least in the immediate future, are likely to involve
simply copying. In the event that future technology.. . permits future infringers
to use an author's program without copying, difficult questions will arise. Should
a line need to be drawn to exclude certain manifestations of programs from copyright, that line should be drawn on a case-by-case basis by the institution
designed to make fine distinctions-the federal judiciary.
Id. at 22.
109. Id. at 21.
110. The prohibition against copyright in useful articles is a fundamental principle
of our copyright laws, adhered to for the nearly 200 years of their existence. In
philosophical terms, the prohibition rests on the distinction between protection
for expression and nonprotection for ideas under copyright, and on the differences in scope, standards, term, and purpose of the patent and copyright systems.
In pragmatic terms, the nonprotection of useful articles that do not meet the patent standards of novelty and invention represents a societal judgment that the
public benefits from relatively unhampered imitative copying of non-novel useful
articles.
H.R. REP. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5750, 5757-58.
111. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8.
112. "It is generally accepted that the [constitutional] clause [calling for intellectual
property protection] is really two provisions merged into one which can be expressed as
follows: The Congress shall have the power to,
1. Promote the progress of science by securing to authors the exclusive right to
their writings.
2. Promote the progress of useful arts by securing to authors the exclusive
rights of their discoveries.
At the time the clause was written the word "science" meant "knowledge" or "learning."
Hence the first phrase refers to copyright protection while the second refers to patent
protection. Kline, Requiringan Election of Protectionfor Patentable/CopyrightableComputer Programs, 6 COMPUTER L.J. 607, 646-47 (1986). See also Graham v. John Deers Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966) (the Supreme Court, quoting the constitutional basis for patent rights,
omitted references to 'science' and 'authors' as being "[t]o promote the Progress of ...
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to... Inventors the exclusive Right to their...
Discoveries.") (Omissions in the original).
The copyrighting of useful works tends to blur the distinction between copyright and
patent and to grant patent protection without requiring the protected work to meet the
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The Copyright Act defines a useful work as one having an "intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of
the article or to convey information. '"" 3 Machine parts are clearly not
copyrightable. Machine language software, being more closely analogous to machine parts than to writings, should not be copyrightable. All
the functions contained in a specific software program could be
114
hardwired into the computer. Early computers were all hardware.
Modern computers can become various machines by the simple insertion of software. The software is thus a machine part, taking the place
of the electrical wires of yesterday. Granting copyright protection to
machine language software logically and inevitably leads to the conclusion that hardwired circuitry, and possibly the computer itself, is copyrightable. 115 In his CONTU dissent, Commissioner Hersey correctly
argued that software in its machine readable form has one object-to do
work," 6 and therefore a computer program in mature and usable form
is a machine control element. As such, it should not be copyrightable
7
on constitutional and social policy grounds."
Machine readable software can best be seen as a useful article
through a simple analogy. Engineering drawings used in the construction of an automobile are copyrightable, since they are works which
only convey information. The car itself is the mechanical embodiment
of the drawings, and has many uses other than to portray an appearance
or convey information. Hence, the car is a utilitarian work and therefore not copyrightable." 8 Construction of the car without the aid of the
innovation standard normally associated with patent. Shih, the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984: Is Copyright Protectionfor UtilitarianArticles Desirable?, 7 CoMPuTEr L.J. 129, 131 (1986). Accord Taylor Instruments Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d
98, 100 (7th Cir 1943) (The distribution between copyright and patent is between that
which "teaches [and] explains the use of the art" and that which "is an essential element
of the machine.").
113. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1978).
114. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
115. Wharton, supra note 75, at 444.
116. "In its machine-control form [the computer program] does not describe or give directions for mechanical work. When activated, it does the work .... mhe instructions
themselves eventually become an essential part of the machinery that produces the results." CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 28 (Hersey, Comm'r, dissenting). "[A] more telling analogy... is afforded by... the cam. A cam, like a mature computer program, is the
objectification of a series of instructions .... [A]ithough such a cam was originally conceptualized, described, and written out as [a] series of instructions for desired work and is,
in its mature form, the material embodiment of the instructions... no one would say...
that it is a literary work and should be copyrighted." Id. at 29-30.
117. "Machine language software is intrinsically utilitarian in nature and its utilitarian
aspects cannot be separated from its non-utilitarian aspects." Id. at 27 (Hersey, Comm'r,
dissenting).
118. See Imperial Homes Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1972). (The defendant
constructed houses based on actual measurements made of plaintiff's model home. The
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drawings does not constitute a copyright infringement on the engineering drawings.
Similarly, software in source code format easily qualifies as a copyrightable writing, since the source code does no useful work but merely
conveys information to human beings. By contrast, once the source
code is compiled into machine readable form, it ceases to convey information to humans and becomes directly usable by the computer to perform work. Hence, while source code clearly deserves copyright
protection, machine language code clearly does not.119 The line of demarcation between copyrightable and noncopyrightable code must fall
somewhere between source and object code. A logical demarcation
would render code noncopyrightable as soon as it is transformed into a
form having mechanical capability.' 20
It is apparent from its final report that the Commission lacked a
clear conception of the functioning of computer software.' 2 ' The Coinplaintiff sued claiming infringement of its architectural plans. The court found that while
the plans were independently copyrightable, they were not infringed when the defendant
constructed house based on his independent measurements.); Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS &
A Group, Inc., 480 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (1979) ("While the ROM is the mechanical embodiment of the source program, it is not a 'copy' of it.").
119. Apart from the disclosure question, allowing copyright of machine language
software opens the way for the covert protection of ideas and machine parts. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 34 (Hersey, Comm'r, dissenting). Granting copyright protection to
useful works in effect gives those works patent protection without submitting the works
to the rigorous registration and disclosure requirements. Wharton, supra note 75, at 460.
For good policy reasons, which the framers of the Constitution perceived, the protection offered by patent and copyright should not be blurred.
Society gives copyrights more freely than patents because a monopoly on a
machine, an idea, or a useful article has a much greater cost to society than does
a monopoly given an author for his work. One the other hand, copyright protection is more narrow than patent protection because society benefits more from
encouraging innovative useful products, and therefore rewards such inventions
more highly than it does nonfunctional products.
Note, Semiconductor Chip Protection Changing Roles for Copyright and Competition, 71
VA. L. REV. 249, 277 (1985).
120. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 33 (Hersey, Comm'r, dissenting). See JS & A,
430 F. Supp. at 1065, 1066 n.4; Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. at 454 (quoting Hubco's Memorandum
at p.4); Heplinger, Computer Intellectual Property Claims: Computer Software & Data
Base Protection,1977 WASH. U. L.Q. 461, 464; M. NimmE, supra note 24, § 2.18[FI.
121. CONTU was formed primarily to study the protection of copyrightable works
when stored on a computer and to study the use of photocopying a hardware material.
The study of extending copyright protection to computer software was not one of
CONTU's original missions. As a result, the Commission's composition did not include
computer software industry representatives or experts. The Commission was comprised
of the following members: Representing the interests of authors and other copyright
owners: 1) John Hersey, President of the Authors League of America, Inc. 2) Dan Lacy,
Senior Vice-President, McGraw-Hill, Inc. 3) E. Gabriel Perle, Vice-President-Law, Time,
Inc. 4) Hershel B. Sarbin, President, Ziff-Davis Publishing Co. Representing copyright
users: 5) William S. Dix, Librarian Emeritus, Princeton University 6) Arthur R. Miller,
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mission, in attempting to clarify the distinctions between software and
processes and methods, stated that copyright does not protect the "electromechanical functioning of a machine."'12 2 Hence, one may make machines perform any conceivable process, except taking another's
program.' 23 Furthermore, according to CONTU, electrical impulses
may be tapped, since they represent a part of a process which is not afforded copyright protection. 124
The trial and appellate court decisions in Apple Computer, Inc. v.
Franklin Computer Corp.12 5 offer an interesting exposition of the utility issue. Apple, a large microcomputer manufacturer, sued Franklin, a
fledgling producer of Apple-compatible computers, alleging copyright
infringement of portions of Apple's operating system. The operating
system resided in machine code on chips in the Apple computer. 126 In
its defense, Franklin challenged the validity of Apple's copyright, relying largely on the claim that the software in question was utilitarian in
nature and thus noncopyrightable1 27 The district court agreed with
Franklin and refused to issue a preliminary injunction, thus allowing
Franklin to continue marketing its computers. 2 8s The appellate court
overruled, holding that Franklin's interpretation of Baker v. Selden'19
to the effect that utilitarian works could not be copyrighted, had been
overruled by Mazer v. Stein' 30 and rejected by CONTU.' 3 ' Furthermore, the appellate court found that computer programs are not
machine parts but are machine instructions. 3 2 The court saw no difference between instructions in a program and instructions in a manual.13
Professor of Law, Harvard Law School 7) Robert Wedgeworth, Executive Director,
American Library Association 8) Alice E. Wilcox, Director, Minnesota Interlibrary Telecommunications exchange Representing the public: 9) George D. Cary, retired Register of
Copyrights 10) Stanley H. Fuld, retired Chief Judge of the State of New York and the
New York Court of Appeals 11) Rhoda H. Karpatkin, Executive Director, Consumers
Union 12) Melville B. Nimmer, Professor of Law, University of California at Los Angeles
Law School. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 4.
122. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 20.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 22.
125. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) [hereinafter Apple II], revg 545 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Pa.
1982) [hereinafter Apple 1],cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984).
126. Apple II, 714 F.2d at 1243.
127. Id. at 1251.
128. Apple I, 545 F. Supp. at 820-21.
129. 101 U.S. 99 (1879).
130. 347 U.S. 201, 218 (1954).
131. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 21.
132. Apple II, 714 F.2d at 1251.
133. The court stated:
Since it is only the instructions which are protected, a "process" is no more involved because the instructions in an operating system program may be used to
activate the operation of the computer than it would be if instructions were writ-
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In conclusion, the court stated that if other code can be written that
will accomplish the same purpose as the disputed programs, then the
programs constitute expression rather than idea and are protectible
under copyright law.ls4
Apart from the utilitarian issue, machine language software raises
the issue of disclosure of the copyrighted work. Humans cannot read
machine language code. This should render such code noncopyrightable, l s5 since copyright legitimately protects only writings.
The term "writing" has been given a broad and ever expanding
meaning.136 The CONTU majority also subscribed to the human readability requirement, but may have misunderstood the technology involved.13 7 Similarly, other commentators have followed this line of
ten in ordinary English in a manual which described the necessary steps to activate an intricate complicated machine. There is, therefore, no reason to afford
any less copyright protection to the instructions in an operating system program
than to the instructions in an application program.
Id.
134. Id. at 1253. See also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 524
(9th Cir. 1984) (software's utility should not effect copyrightability).
Two recent examples serve to further illustrate similar distortions of the copyright
law. In E.F. Johnson, the defendant claimed that the software's copyright was invalid
since it purported to protect a useful work. The court, unable to counter the argument on
other grounds, simply asserted that the 1976 Copyright Act classified software as a literary work and, hence, 17 U.S.C. § 101, restricting copyright to nonuseful works, is not applicable. E.F. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1498. Further, in attempting to find substantial
similarity between the two programs, the court in Whelan constructed and applied its
own two-part test. First, the court inquired into the purpose of the software. Then, it
tried to determine the particular type of expression used. The court conceded that it
would be difficult to apply its test in non-utilitarian cases. Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1238.
135. The House of Representatives intended that the copyrightable work be perceivable not by a machine, but by a human thorough use of a machine. H.R. REP. No. 1476,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 5659, 5665.
136. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 14. The Constitution sanctions such an expansion. As Judge Learned Hand said in Reiss v. National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. 717
(S.O.N.Y. 1921), "[O]ur Constitution [does not] embalm inflexibly the habits of 1989... its
grants of power to Congress comprise, not only what was then known, but what the ingenuity of men should devise thereafter." Id. at 719. Congress has steadily expanded copyright protection. A short chronology is illustrative.
"1802 Designs, engravings, and etchings
1831 Musical compositions
1856 Dramatic compositions
1865 Photographs and negatives
1870 Statuary and models
1909 All the writings of an author
1912 Motion pictures
1972 Sound recordings
1976 Original works of authorship"
Id. at 15.
137. The Commission considered the machine language version of a program to be a
copy of the program. "But a program, when keyed or run into a computer, is transformed
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reasoning.1 s The Commission wrote that program instructions "may be
read, understood, and followed by a human being."' 39 Source code
meets this description, but machine code decidedly does not. 140 While
CONTU stressed the human readability of copyrighted works, it simultaneously treated software as writings, thus dispensing with the fundamental requirement of disclosure. 141 The copyrighting of a work
142
lacking human readability troubled Commissioner Melville Nimmer.
Nimmer realized that the extensive scope of protection offered by the
majority might in the future prove over-restrictive and suggested instead that copyright protection be limited to software which was itself
capable of producing copyrightable works.143 Although Commissioner
Nimmer reluctantly concurred in the CONTU majority opinion, Commissioner Hersey dissented. Hersey contended that the "writing" requirement mandated that software not only act to communicate rather
than do work, but that the communication be to humans, not to
machines. 144
It is quite possible that CONTU may have perceived machine language software to be human-readable, since it was ostensibly possible,
with the aid of a device, to make the software yield its expression in
human readable form.145 The Commission drew an analogy with videotape which when passed over a magnetized head, causes electrical currents to flow and regenerates the expression into a form which humans
can perceive. 146 The analogy, however, is inappropriate. While the
videotape machine converts the information embedded in the videotape
into a human readable expression, which is a precise recreation of the
by a compiler program into a purely machine state. The term copy is meaningless for the
reason that in this transformation the means of expression of the original work become

totally irrelevant. All that matters is the program's functional use." Id. at 32 (Hersey,
Comm'r, dissenting).

138. Wharton, supra note 75, at 440.
139. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 10.
140. JS & A, 480 F. Supp. at 1065.
141. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 10, 20, 22.
142. In reluctantly concurring in the Commission's recommendations, Commissioner
Nirnmer pointed out that the majority offered no rationale for its decision to copyright
software. Nimmer warned that this action raised serious constitutional questions in that
it risks turning the copyright law into a general misappropriation law. Id. at 26 (Nimmer,
Comm'r, concurring).
143. Id.

What seems to have swayed Commissioner Nimmer to concur with CONTU is

the perceived urgency of providing formalized protection. Id. at 26-27.
144. Id. at 28-29 (Hersey, Comm'r, dissenting). Accord JS & A, 480 F. Supp. at 1068;
Apple I, 545 F. Supp. at 821.
145. A similar misconception can be seen in Williams where the court noted that
ROM-resident object code programs may be indirectly perceived by the user "with the aid
of a machine or device." Williams, 685 F.2d at 873.
146. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 10.
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author's original work, the computer does not render the machine code
readable by a human. The screens displayed by those software programs which display output are not an expression of the machine code.
Rather, they are the result of the work the computer system
1 47
performed.
The failure to distinguish between the computer program and the
audiovisual displays produced by many, but not all, 14 programs has
greatly contributed to the confusion. The copyrightable work which,
for purposes of copyright law, must be human-readable is the actual
code, not the product or result of implementing the code on a computer.
Computer program outputs are largely independent of the underlying
code. Vastly different programs can create very similar outputs.149
Conversely, a programmer can quickly alter an identical copy of a
software program to produce vastly dissimilar screen or other outputs.
While the audiovisual displays may superficially resemble displays of
copyrightable expression, they in fact express none of the computer
program instructions which are the intended subject matter of software
copyright protection. 150
The relative independence of computer software and program outputs poses a fundamental problem not encountered in previous technologies. 151 An integral part of the social contract underpinning patent
and copyright laws is the idea that the inventor or author must disclose
his work to the public in exchange for some degree of legally sanctioned
monopoly. Such disclosure is a fundamental constitutional require147. The functions of computer programs are fundamentally and absolutely different in nature from those of sound recordings, motion pictures, or videotapes. Recordings, films, and videotape produce for the human ear and/or eye the sounds
and images that were fed into them and so are simply media for transmitting the
means of expression of the writings of their authors. The direct product of a
sound recording, when it is put in a record player, is the sound of music-the
writing of the author in its audible form. Of film, it is a combination of picture
and sound-the writing of the author in its visible and audible forms. Of videotape, the same. But the direct product of a computer program is a series of electronic impulses which operate a computer; the 'writing' of the author is spent in
the labor of the machine. The first three communicate with human beings. The
computer program communicates, if at all, only with a machine.
Id. at 29 (Hersey, Comm'r, dissenting).
148. For example, operating systems produce no visible output.
149. Stern Electronics, Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852, 855 (2d Cir. 1982).
150. For the most part, the typical user of computer software does not care to see the
detailed instructions which comprise the program. The user is simply interested in the
efficient functioning of the program.
151. The problem did not come up before the advent of computer software, since
humans could perceive the expression of all previously copyrightable materials. Although
neither the Constitution nor the Copyright Act explicitly calls for disclosure of copyrighted works, disclosure has always been an implied requirement of copyright law. See
Baker, 101 U.S. at 103.
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ment. Unlike trade secrecy law, copyright law is designed to encourage
communication. 152 However, currently nearly all copyrighted software
is distributed in machine code form which has virtually no disclosure
value. 153 Paradoxically, a programmer can publish a copyrightable
work and at the same time keep it secret.154 Some commentators are
concerned that without disclosure copyright may become the primary
means of enforcing trade secrecy. 15s
The purpose of copyright law is to encourage the creation of copyrightable works by protecting the copyright owner from competition in
exchange for his disclosure of the copyrighted material.' 56 Computer
software is an undeniably useful technology and should be protected in
some way. 157 But is copyright the proper protection? The computer
software industry is itself uncertain. While copyright protection is far
less costly to obtain and maintain than either patent or trade secrecy
protection, l s s the computer software industry has been and continues to
152. Maer, 347 U.S. at 219 ("The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering
Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in 'Science and the useful Arts.' ").
153. See D. HOFSTADTER, GODEL, EsCHER, BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID 290
(1980). A machine language program consists of a highly complex array of millions of
electrical impulses. With the aid of decompilers or disassemblers, it is possible to make
some rudimentary sense of a program in machine language form. However, more often it
is more manageable to simply start by observing the functioning of the program and
reprogramming the functions in source code.
154. Ralph S. Brown, the noted copyright scholar, stated that "[t]he notion of secret
copyrights is abominable." N.Y. Times, July 5, 1983, at 29, col. 3. However, the deposit
rules make it quite easy to register software for copyright protection without disclosing
anything of value to the public. For example, an author may seek "special relief' which is
readily granted. Under such relief, the deposit requirements are satisfied provided the deposit is made in one of the following ways:
(1) Deposit of the first and last 25 pages of the object code and any 10 pages of
source code.
(2) Deposit of the first and last pages of source code.
(3) Deposit of the first and the last 25 pages of source code with the blocking
out of any portion, so long as approximately 50% of the source code remains
unblocked.
37 C.F.R. § 202.20(d) (1987).
155. SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 816; see also Hubco, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 450 (relief was
sought for both copyright infringement and trade secrecy misappropriation). Copyright
law does offer the advantage of access to the federal courts which have exclusive jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1982). Allowing copyright law to protect trade secrets transforms
copyright law into a general misappropriation law. See also Note, Copyright Protection of
Computer Program Object Code, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1723, 1741 (1983).
156. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 3. See also Note, supra note 78, at 498 and H.R.
REP. No. 781, 9th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-13, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 5750, 5754.
157. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 11.
158. Obtaining copyright protection requires the author to (1) display the copyright no-
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be reluctant to rely exclusively or even primarily on copyright for
software protection.'5 9 Surprisingly, for all its legislative sanction,
i 6°
copyright protection is used sparingly in the industry.
When CONTU issued its recommendations in 1978, it was satisfied
that extending copyright protection to software was not likely to grant
excessive monopoly power to software authors and would have an insignificant effect on the price of software products.' 6 ' CONTU realized
that the industry was changing rapidly 62 and urged that its recommendations be reviewed periodically to assess the impact on prices, competition, and cultural values.' 63 The time to reassess the extension of
copyright protection to machine language software has arrived. A reassessment would reveal that copyright protection or machine language
computer software is inappropriate. Furthermore, since other means,
both legal and technological, exist for protecting software, i 64 copyright
protection is also unnecessary.
V.

PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

Computer software should be protected, 6 5 but only to an appropritice on the work; and (2) register the claim by depositing a partial copy of the work with
the Copyright Office and paying a nominal fee. In reality, protection is available without
registration. However, the work must be registered before bringing an infringement action. 17 U.S.C. §§ 408, 708 (1982).
159. See Note, Trade Secrets and the Skilled Employee in the Computer Industry, 61
WASH. U. L.Q. 823, 838 (1983).
160. See Milgrim, Protection and Licensing of Software, USC COMPUTER LAW INST. § 1
(1982); CONTU, supra note 7, at 34 (Hersey, Comm'r, dissenting) (The software industry
has "no intention of giving up trade secrecy protection in favor of copyright."); see also id.
at 18 ("The availability of copyright for computer programs does not... affect the availability of trade secrecy protection."). Many in the industry, particularly the larger
software houses, would prefer to have the considerable added benefits of copyright protection, but only if the disclosure requirement omitted. However, such protection would
strengthen larger companies while weakening smaller competitors. Id. at 36 (Hersey,
Comm'r, dissenting).
161. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 23.
162. Virtually the entire microcomputer revolution has taken place since the issuance
of the CONTU report.
163. See CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 12.
164. Id. at 30. One commentator argues that "[m]ultiple protection provides little, if
any, added incentive to programmers, thus dispelling the myth that more protection provides little, if any, added incentive to programmers, thus dispelling the myth that more
protection creates more invention. Multiple protection hinders the progress of technology
by limiting the usefulness of a program and increases the likelihood of technological stagnation." Kline, supra note 112, at 609-10. Kline also argues that multiple protection constitutes a failure of consideration in the social bargain which skews that bargain in favor
of rewarding the author/inventor at the expense of competition. Id. at 639.
165. Most commentators agree that some protection is required. Davidson, supra note
70, at 1073.
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ate extent. An appropriate method of protection would satisfy certain
requirements. The method should proscribe unauthorized copying
without inhibiting use or blocking development, and it should not give
the author of the original program too much economic power. 16 While
safeguarding the author's investment, the protection should allow competitors to analyze the design and incorporate its concepts into their
own works. 1 67 Historically, Congress has expanded the scope of copyright protection to cover new types of works. Once bestowed on a class
of works, copyright protection has never been withdrawn.1ss To foster
the software industry's growth, this trend should now be interrupted by
withdrawing copyright protection from machine language software.
Copyright protection of machine language software is unnecessary
as well as inappropriate. Withdrawing copyright protection from
machine language software will not leave programmers at the mercy of
unscrupulous competitors, since other means, both technological and
legal, can protect such software. 169
One obvious option is to follow the current course taken by most
courts by adjusting copyright law on an ad hoc basis to accommodate
the fundamentally different situation presented by software. This approach is undesirable for two reasons. First, it consumes an inordinate
amount of judicial resources and yields inconsistent results. Second, the
excessive litigation is unfair to smaller industry members, since it can
easily force them out of business by compelling them to defend an infringement suit.' 70 Inconsistent judicial results coupled with the threat
of financially devastating litigation makes it very difficult for software
developers to function efficiently and prevents potential developers
from competitively entering the industry. Society pays for this diminished competition through higher consumer prices and technological
stagnation.
Most commentators agree that patent protection is also not the answer. 171 The case law is inconclusive. However, because of the substantial threshold requirements of novelty, particularly nonobviousness,
patent law would be appropriate for only a minute fraction of all
software products. 172 Further, it takes too long, relative to the short
166. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 12.
167. Shih, supra note 112, at 137.
168. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 15.
169. Among the legal devices which may be used are contract, nondisclosure, trade secret, common law misappropriation, patent, etc. Id. at 30 (Hersey, Comm'r, dissenting).
See supra note 166.
170. Info World, Jan. 19, 1987, at 8, col. 1.
171. See infra note 166.
172. By one estimate, fewer than one percent of all software systems are patentable.
Davidson, Protecting Computer Software. A Comprehensible Analysis, 1983 ARIz. ST. L.J.
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useful life of typical software products, to secure patent protection. 173
Creating a new body of intellectual property law designed specifically to accommodate software might inject a dose of certainty into
software protection. 174 Besides augmenting certainty in the software industry, such sui generis legislation could arrest the distortion of copyright law as applied to non-software works. Such distortion has
occurred as courts attempt to squeeze machine language software into
the copyright law mold.
A sui generis law was developed recently to protect semiconductor
chips. 175 The preliminary reviews are mixed. Integrated circuits form
the core of computer hardware. While chip design requires a great deal
of expertise and time, reverse engineering an existing commercial chip
is fairly inexpensive. 176 The 1984 Chip Act was enacted to provide chip
manufacturers with some protection from exact duplication. While the
Senate Committee recommended that a modified copyright law accommodate chip technology, the House Committee's recommendation for a
177
sui generis form of protection prevailed.
Opponents have two main objections to copyright law protecting
chips. First, chips are useful articles and therefore ineligible for copyright protection. Second, even if chips were a proper subject matter for
copyright purposes, the chip's protectible expression is inseparable from
611, 647 (1983). To be patentable, software must meet the standards of "usefulness," "novelty," and "nonobviousness." Patent statutes defined nonobviousness as follows. "A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to
which said subject matter pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1987). "While a mathematic or functional principle incorporated in a program may satisfy these requirements, the software
itself is patentable only if the manner in which the principle is utilized is also new and
useful." Note, supra note 1, at 239. Computer software may or may not be per se patentable. The Patent Office at one time declared that "computer programming per se... shall
not be patentable." Examination of Patent Applications on Computer Programs, 33 Fed.
Reg. 15, 610 (1968). However, subsequent case law, though far from conclusive, raised the
possibility that software may be patentable. See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981);
Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalt v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
173. The patent application process takes an average of two years, not including the
time required to draft the patent application. In comparison, the commercial lifespan of
most computer programs is under three years. Id. at 258.
174. Davidson, supra note 70, at 1072.
175. Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, Tit. III, 98 Stat.
3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-14 (Supp. II 1984) [hereinafter The Chip Act].
176. This process is usually done by chemically stripping successive layers and
photographing the exposed layers. Then, the photographs can be used as a blueprint of
the chip.
177. See Note, supra note 119, at 253 ("[IThe Act provides neither appropriate nor adequate protection for chips and that protection should come, if at all, from sui generis law
completely independent from copyright law.").
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its idea, making chips unprotectible under copyright law. 178 The same
arguments can be made for denying the machine language software
copyright protection.
Commentators also criticize the Chip Act on constitutional and
pragmatic grounds. The Chip Act mixes elements of copyright and patent law. Scholars object to mixing these elements, because it creates an
unconstitutional blurring of patent and copyright law. 1 79 Beyond this
fundamental difficulty, the Chip Act has been vehemently criticized because it fails to provide guidance as to when a chip infringes the protection of a predecessor chip. It improperly sidesteps the very problem it
was designed to resolve. Indeed, an infringement standard is conspicuously missing from the Chip Act.1 80 Thus, it is unlikely that courts applying the Chip Act will find it easier to determine infringement in
chips than to determine whether two software programs are substantially similar. Like the Chip Act, sui generis law, which is modelled
largely on copyright law, cannot properly protect machine language
software for the same reasons that copyright law is not effective.' 8 '
While the software industry would prefer to retain copyright protection, it adamantly refuses to permit public disclosure of its software
source code. Nondisclosure defies longstanding copyright principles.
The software industry is unlikely to agree with a system that would require code disclosure. As a result, trade secrecy has been and continues
to be the industry's overwhelming favorite form of protection.18 2
CONTU considered trade secrecy as the primary method of protection
and rejected it due to its inherent "secrecy.' 8 3 CONTU preferred copyright protection because of its openness. However, the current software
copyright system, with its provisions for limited disclosure, preserves secrecy to no lesser a degree than does trade secrecy.
178. Id. at 276-77. As with software, patent protection for chips has little use, since
chips do not usually satisfy the novelty and nonobviousness standards. Unlike software,
trade secrecy is totally ineffective for chip protection, since the secrets embedded in chips
can easily be perceived by reverse engineering.
179. "[T]he Act offers copyright protection to utilitarian chips and grants unprecedented monopoly rights, similar to patents, without strict standards of review." Id. at 292.
180. Note, Copyright Law and Integrated Circuit Protection: When the Chips are
Down .... 6 COMPUTER L.J. 543, 554 (1986).
181. See supra general discussion of copyright law.
182. See Davidson, supa note 172, at 717-18; MacGrady, Protection of Computer
Software-An Update and PracticalSynthesis, 20 Hous. L. REv. 1033, 1050 (1983). Licensing of software under trade secrecy has been the most important vehicle for acquiring
rights in software. Bender, supra note 9, at 419. A Kidder, Peabody study concluded that
software developers will continue to rely heavily on trade secrecy for software protection.
Kidder, Peabody & Co., Computer Industry Follow-Up, Software and Microcode-The
Coming ProprietaryEdge: Can It Be Protected? (Jan. 2, 1980). Call Trade Secret Laws
Best Way to Protect Investment, ELECTRONIC NEws, Jan. 14, 1980, at 54.
183. CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 17-18.
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A comparison of copyright and trade secrecy law, as applied to
software, reveals some important advantages to trade secrecy. The establishment of trade secrecy requires fewer formalities than copyright
registration. No registration is required, and protection is available immediately. More importantly, unlike copyright, trade secrecy protection
extends to the algorithms embodied in the software. The industry has
found copyright protection unsatisfactory primarily because it does not
protect the software's most valuable aspects. While copyright protects
the expression, including the actual source code, the industry would
also like to protect the program's design and logic, including the concepts, techniques, methods, and processes.'i 4 Trade secrecy protects all
of the above aspects.1 85
Trade secrecy is defined in a variety of ways.' 8 6 While software is a
proper subject matter for trade secrecy protection, 8 7 applying trade secrecy protection to computer software has certain potential problems.'l 8
One potential difficulty is the lack of uniform trade secrecy law among
the states.'8 9 Perhaps Congress, under its Commerce Clause power,
should enact a uniform federal trade secrecy legislation. The law could
serve to create a federal cause of action for computer program misappropriation-a Federal Software Trade Secrecy Act. 19° However, congressional legislation is unnecessary to apply trade secrecy to software.
Trade secrecy can effectively protect software even in the absence of
such federal action. Trade secrecy laws in various states have similar
major provisions. Finally, software vendors can include a choice of law
provision in their license agreements which will unequivocally stipulate
184. Note, supra note 38, at 265.
185. Note, supra note 1, at 240; see also MacGrady, supra note 182, at 1051.
186. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1934); MacGrady, supra
note 175, at 1051, 1080; Bender, supra note 9, at 428; R. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY 3.06, 3-14, 17 (accord E.F.Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1051 n.17, 18, 19, 52 (1985)); J.
McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 10:25 322 (1973); Note, supra note 1,
at 238.
187. Davidson, supra note 172, at 719.
188. See CONTU Report, supra note 7, at 17; Bender, supra note 9, at 447; Davidson,
supra note 172, at 718-19. Employee mobility in the software industry is notoriously high.
This may result in trade secrecy litigation when a valued employee leaves one company to
join a competitor which then begins to market a product similar to one which the original

employer had sold. Id. at 728. See also Goodpasture,807 F.2d at 1256, Q-Co, 625 F. Supp.
at 608 (weighing the difference between general skills of employees and trade secrets of

the employer).
189. Davidson, supra note 172, at 729. See also Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 655
F. Supp. 750, 762-63 (E.D. La. 1987) (conflict between the Louisiana Software Licensing
Enforcement Act and the Federal Copyright Act).
190. This law would be a type of sui generis legislation, but not based on intellectual
property law. Davidson, supra note 172, at 746.
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which state's law will control in case of conflicts. 191

Widespread distribution of software packages presents the most serious difficulty with trade secrecy protection of software. 192 Trade secrecy does not protect information which has been disclosed to others
through publication. The courts have not definitively resolved whether
a software developer's sale of thousands of copies of a software program
on the national market constitutes publication. The case law is sparse
and inconclusive. 193 However, most commentators argue that mass distribution of software in object code format is a distribution under secrecy conditions which does not constitute publication; therefore, trade
secrecy protection is not negated.' 4 Distribution of software solely in
object code form ensures actual and legal secrecy of the programs regardless of the extent of such distribution. 195
Unlike patent and copyright law, trade secrecy law has the potential to afford precisely the right level of software protection and to preserve the incentive to create for programmers. At the same time, trade
secrecy law can avoid giving programmers so much protection that competition is stifled and programmers are allowed to reap inordinately
large profits at the public's expense. Trade secrecy clearly encourages
competition by allowing programmers to reproduce existing software, as
191. MacGrady, supra note 182, at 1077.
192. See Note, supra note 38, at 264; Note, supra note 1, at 240; Davidson, supra note
172, at 727.
193. See generally Technicon Medical Information Sys. Corp. v. Green Bay Packaging,
Inc., 687 F.2d 1032 (7th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 459 U.S. 1106 (1983) (trade secrecy preserved despite distribution of manuals with copyright marks); Management Science of
Am., Inc. v. Cyborg Sys., Inc., 6 C.L.S.R. 921 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (no infirmity arising by virtue
of mere proliferation); Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 564 F. Supp. 1471, 1476 (D. Nev.
1983) ("where such a computer program is made readily available to the public ... its
contents may not be deemed a trade secret unless access to it is actually treated as a secret"). See also J & K Computer Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 642 P.2d 732, 735 (Utah 1982)
("[t]hat a few of the plaintiff's customers had access to the program does not prevent the
program from being classified as a trade secret where the plaintiff was attempting to keep
the secret...").
194. Distributors desiring to retain a claim of trade secrecy enhance the force of
their claim if distribution is in a form that tends to conceal or reduce access to
the underlying secret. In the context of software, for example, if the secret resides in the underlying algorithm, distribution in object code, rather than source
code form, is desirable since discovery of the underlying design is more difficult.
R. NIMMER, supra note 186, at 3-18.
See also Davidson, supra note 172, at 726-27 (A solution to the problem has been to
"market software by license only, requiring the licensee to sign a restrictive covenant acknowledging the trade secret status of the software, acknowledging restrictions on use,
transfer or disclosure of the software, and requiring the licensee to take certain protective
measures to preserve the confidentiality of the trade secret."); MacGrady, supra note 182,
at 1063 ("[s]ecrecy will not be destroyed by the wide distribution of computer programs if
they are distributed in object form only.").
195. MacGrady, supra note 182, at 1054-59.
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long as they do so without misappropriating-without the benefit of
seeing the source code or other confidential materials. However, does
trade secrecy preserve sufficient incentive for the original developer
who has spent much time and effort to create an innovative program?
A programmer can reproduce existing software at a considerably
reduced cost. He avoids organizing a complex system and suffering
through the false starts and experimentation inherent in the development of original software. He does, however, need to create a working
program, which involves a considerable effort in coding and debugging.
In recreating a program, the programmer is unlikely to reproduce the
exact original program. He is virtually certain to make changes and enhancements, usually resulting in a better product. Because of his lower
costs, he can undersell the original manufacturer. The critical question
is, will the new social bargain leave the original manufacturer with sufficient incentive to ensure the continued production of new and original
software?
Any software protection scheme must afford developers of valuable
software the opportunity to recoup their investment. Fortunately, because of the technology's inherently short lifespan, this goal can readily
be accomplished without imposing extraneous legal constraints. The average lifespan of mass marketed software is extremely short, with a
typical elapsed time of one year between the introduction of a popular
original package and the issuance of an upgrade. 196 Creators of original
software will have the benefit of lead time, since contract provisions
and trade secrecy law can ban direct copying and misappropriation. 197
196. Upgrades are enhancements to existing software which are issued periodically by
the developer in order to improve the capabilities and performance of the original
program.
197. The lead-time gained by an innovator who is first to market a good product,
creates special profits. Indeed, those who are first enjoy a form of product monopoly that lasts until they are copied. (Footnote omitted.) Moreover, copying is
seldom immediate; generally, the more sophisticated or involved [the product],
the longer it will take to copy. (Footnote omitted.] More fundamentally, it is
competition that provides much of the impetus behind innovation.
Note, supra note 119, at 288. Robert Noyce, one of the inventors of the chip and a founder
of Intel Corp., speaking of chips, stated that "[a] year's advantage in introducing a new
product or new process can give a company a 25 percent cost advantage over competing
companies; conversely, a year's lag puts a company at a significant disadvantage with respect to its competitor." Noyce, Microelectronics,237 Sc. AM. 62, 68 (Sept. 1977).
The software manufacturer can take steps to prevent rote copying and other trade
secret misappropriation. Under trade secrecy law the source code will not be registered,
but the audiovisual screens may be copyrightable if they qualify. Stern, 669 F.2d at 855.
Where available, this should provide effective protection against a competitor who copies
outright. Requiring software developers to preserve for an appropriate period of time a
'paper trail' of their software development process also prevents literal copying. This
could be used as evidence in any potential trade secrecy litigation. A legitimate researcher creates such a paper trail of his progress, including earlier versions of the pro-
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Several months will elapse before a competitor is able to bring out a
competing product, because it takes a certain amount of time for competitors to realize which programs are popular enough to warrant a
competing product and to reproduce the original program. Once on the
market, the new product will require additional time to become known
and to gain market share. A year or more will elapse from introduction
of the original product, and the original manufacturer will be introducing a product upgrade. If the competitor had simply reproduced the
original software without making significant enhancements, his product
will now be competing with a superior (albeit probably more costly) upgraded original product. If, however, the competitor made valuable enhancements, the original manufacturer will be forced to make
significant modifications and/or to reduce the price of the new products.
In any case, the lead time will preserve ample incentive for original developers by affording them a reasonable chance to recoup their investment, while the absence of copyright protection will give competitors
the ability to compete freely. Such free competition will inevitably lead
to enhanced social welfare through reduced consumer costs and increased software availability and usage. Thus, both the original developer and his competitors will be spurred to create reasonably priced yet
significantly enhanced products.19 8
VI.

CONCLUSION

The fundamental inappropriateness of copyright law to protect
machine language software is the underlying cause of the confusion reflected in recent software copyright infringement court decisions. According copyright protection to inherently utilitarian machine language
software programs violates the constitutional intent of keeping patent
gram, while a literal copier does not. Wilf, A Chip Off the Old Block: Copyright Law and
the Semiconductor Chip ProtectionAct, 7 COMPUTER L.J. 245, 249 (1986).
A literal copier will be unable to compete with the original developer in user support,
and will, of course, be unable to upgrade his product. Further protection can be obtained
by including in the program code certain fingerprints or house marks-pieces or redundant or superfluous code whose only function is to serve as proof of literal copying. See
Davidson, supranote 166, at 732; Bender, supra note 9, at 459. Such extraneous code and
similar proof of copying may be enough to show misappropriation, providing that the
proper level of secrecy and a confidential relationship have been established. R. NIMMER,
supra note 179, at 3-53. In fact, recent court decisions have looked at such evidence of
literal copying and may have based their decisions on such conduct to a greater extent
than they would admit. See Kramer,783 F.2d at 446 (hidden legend included in the original program was duplicated in the infringing program); SAS, 605 F. Supp. at 821 (redundant functionless code included); E.F. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1493-97 (infringing
program contained numerous instances of such "coincidental" similarities).
198. As a direct result, software vendors will compete among themselves for after-sale
service and user support, usable manuals, and training as well as for programs.
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and copyright law strictly separate and dangerously skews the social
bargain between society and software developers. Application of copyright protection to machine language software creates uncertainty and
discomfort in the computer software industry. This, in turn, stifles progress, reduces competition, and raises consumer prices. Collaterally, it
distorts copyright law as applied to non-software works.
Copyright protection of machine language software is inappropriate
and unnecessary. Adequate forms of protection, especially trade secrecy
law, are already available. In particular, using trade secrecy law, as the
software industry does, but without the unwarranted interference of
copyright law is recommended. This will help effect an appropriate balance in the social contract between software developers and society at
large. Trade secrecy provides incentives for developers to create more
technically advanced software and promotes healthy competition in the
industry.

